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Epistemic deference is the phenomenon in which one person uses the de-
liverances of some information source, perhaps the opinions of another
person, as a model for what to believe. The paper aims to clarify the na-
ture of epistemic deference in probabilistic contexts, to explain the condi-
tions under which deference is appropriate, and to examine deference to
objective chances, as epitomized in David Lewis’s Principal Principle.
This latter analysis will show, in contrast with views that portray chance
as an ideal inductive logician with total recall, that our deference to
chance is grounded in contingent limitations on our ability to access in-
formation and our recognition that the physical probabilities that instan-
tiate the actual chances codify all the types of information that humans
are able to possess.
My broad topic is epistemic deference, the phenomenon in which
one person uses the opinions of another, either a real person or
some idealized information source, as a model for what to believe.
Three questions will be addressed: How should we model epistemic
deference within subjective probability theory?1 What is it for a be-
liever to regard another as being worthy of deference? Can we iso-
late substantive conditions under which one believer should defer to
another? In addressing the last question I will be considering the
case of objective chance, which is often used as a paradigm for def-
erence to an epistemic expert. I will conclude that, contrary to views
that portray chance as a kind of super inductive reasoner, the basis
of our epistemic deference to chance is primarily to be found in facts
about our limitations as knowers.
1 I use the framework of subjective probability theory not because I think it psychologically
realistic, but because it provides useful first step in evaluating claims about belief and justi-
fication. Claims in general epistemology that are implausible in the idealized probabilistic
framework are unlikely to hold up in more realistic contexts.©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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A Framework for Talking About Evidence. Let us imagine items of
evidence as information about the values of probability functions.
In simple cases, these are propositions of the form q(A)=x, where q
specifies a probability function non-rigidly, A is a proposition, and
0  x  1 is a real number.2 For example, if A says that the next
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will be from the Conserva-
tive Party, then I might have evidence of the following sorts:
menow(A)=0.5↔My current subjective probability for A is 0.5.
ladbrokesnow(A)=0.6↔The bookmakers at Ladbrokes are
now accepting bets for A at odds of 6–4 on.
chnow(A)=0.4↔The current objective chance of A is 0.4.
This is a more general way of representing evidence than one might
imagine. Since truth-value-at-world-w—the function truthw(A) that
assigns A a value of 1 (or 0) iff it is true (false) in w—is a probabili-
ty function, this framework is adequate for any sort of information
that can be expressed propositionally. In more general cases, a per-
son’s evidence might comprise data about values of probability
functions over a range of propositions. Such data can be expressed
as a (perhaps infinite) conjunction: (q1(A1) = x1∧q2(A2) = x2∧
q2(A2) = x2∧ …). Or, it might be that a believer only knows that
the various probabilities fall within various interval ranges. In other
situations, a believer might have evidence about the relationship
among the values of non-rigidly specified probability functions, as
when one learns that the bookies at Ladbrokes and William Hill are
2 Formally, we are dealing with a probability spaced defined in the following way: Start with
a Boolean algebra of propositions V, and some finite set of probability functions Q={q, r, s,
…} defined on V that are specified non-rigidly. First, we extend V to V1, the algebra gener-
ated by all propositions (B∧q(A)=x) for A, B∈V, q∈Q, and x∈[0,1]. Proceeding by
recursion, Vm+1 is the algebra generated by all propositions (B∧q(A)=x) for A, B∈V,
q∈Q, and x∈[0,1]. Our probability space is V*=limm V
m, the smallest set containing all
the Vm. It is crucial here to denote probabilities using non-rigid designators to avoid Miller’s
paradox (Miller, 1966). To keep things straight, I am using lower-case italicized letters when
a probability is specified non-rigidly, and upper-case bold letters when it is specified rigidly.
Thus, in ‘q(A)=P(A)’, q(A) is a non-rigid description, like ‘the bias of this coin landing
head’, and P(A) is a real number, like 0.25.©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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have the form q1(A1)  q2(A2). In still other cases, a believer might
know that some non-rigidly specified probability is identical to
some rigidly specified one, as when the probability that gives the po-
tential outcomes of the toss of a certain die is known to be the uni-
form distribution over the faces. Here we write the evidence as q=P,
on the understanding that this means q(A)=P(A) for all proposi-
tions A for which q(A) makes sense.
I will assume a simple probabilistic model of learning on which ac-
quiring the data that q(A)=x involves updating one’s opinions by Baye-
sian conditioning. A person whose ‘prior’ opinions are represented by
a subjective probability, or credence function, C (always assumed to
be coherent) will take the data q(A)=x into account by adopting a
new credence function C(•|q(A)=x) provided C(q(A)=x)  0. When
the evidence is that A is actually true we will write this as C(•|A).
II
Epistemic Deference. Believers can have attitudes of deference, in-
difference or disdain toward sources of probabilistic information.
These attitudes are revealed in a believer’s tendencies to shift her
credences toward or away from the source’s values when she discov-
ers what these values are. Here are some of the attitudes a believer
with credences C might have with regard to the information that x
is q’s probability for A:3
No Deference: C might treat q’s probability for A as irrelevant
to A’s truth or falsity, in which case C(A|q(A)=x)=C(A).
Weak Deference: C might assign q some weight on the matter
of A but not as much as she assigns herself, so that
C(A|q(A)=x) falls between C(A) and ½ C(A)+½x.
Equal Deference: C might see q as an epistemic equal in re A,
and so ‘split the difference’ by setting C(A|q(A)=x)=
½C(A)+½x.
3 One can also have relations of super-deference, and anti-deference.©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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truth-value than her own, but still assign her own views some
weight, so that C(A|q(A)=x) falls between x and ½C(A)+ ½x.
Complete Deference: C might take q as what Gaifmann (1986)
calls an epistemic expert when it comes to A, in which case
C(A|q(A)=x)=x.
A person’s deferential attitudes can depend on both the content of
the proposition in question and the probability assigned to it. Even
sources to which one defers without reservation on certain subjects,
might merit disdain regarding others. Likewise, even for a fixed
proposition, one might defer to a source’s probability assignments
when these fall in certain ranges, but reject them when they fall in
others. For example, after a physical examination I might well defer
to my physician’s opinion on the probability of my living to see my
hundredth birthday if he reports a value of less than 0.2. But, I
might ignore him entirely if he announces a probability of 0.99.
Here, I am in the situation Hume described in the ‘On Miracles’ sec-
tion of the Enquiry, in which an otherwise reliable source might not
be believed simply because its reports are too incredible. Quoting
the ancient Roman saying, ‘I should not believe such a story were it
told me by Cato,’ Hume concludes that the antecedent incredibility
of an event can invalidate even a great authority’s testimony to its
occurrence. Whether or not we follow Hume in thinking that this
undermines reports of miracles, he is surely right that the appropri-
ateness of epistemic deference toward information sources often de-
pends on what information those sources convey.
The probability that an information source assigns to A is only
likely to influence one’s deferential stance toward the source when
one has strong independent reasons for assigning A a different prob-
ability. In most other circumstances—especially those in which
one’s opinion about A is based on flimsy evidence, or when one has
a firm view about the source’s reliability—one’s esteem might not
depend at all on its particular probability assignments. The strength
of one’s deference to the source can then be measured by a single pa-
rameter l∈[0,1] that satisfies the equation C(A|q(A)=x)=lx+
(1−l)·C(A) for every x∈[0,1]. When someone defers to a source in
this way we shall say that source serves as an epistemic comrade in©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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equals are comrades with l=½.
The deference implied in epistemic comradeship is always
grounded in a believer’s antecedent expectations about what a com-
rade’s probabilities are likely to be. One can best see this by noting
that the following are necessary conditions for C to regard q and r
as epistemic comrades in re A:
Agreement in Expectation: C(A)=SxC(q(A)=x)·x.
Agreement on Certainties: C(A)=1 iff C(q(A)=1)=1.
No Expected Divergence Among Comrades:
SxC(q(A)= x ∧ r(A)=y)·(x−y)=0.
4
These requirements enforce a kind of agreement among epistemic
comrades. While one can disagree with one’s epistemic comrades
about A, and can even regard this disagreement as quite likely, one
must agree with one’s comrades in expectation. That is, one’s ex-
pected value for all of one’s comrades’ probabilities for A must coin-
cide with one’s credence in A.
III
What Makes It Reasonable to Defer? Nothing said so far tells us an-
ything about when it is or is not reasonable for a believer to treat an
information source as an epistemic comrade. Two related issues
arise. First, it would be useful to have some inventory of the features
that a source should possess to make it reasonable for a believer to
treat it as a comrade. Second, though deference is largely a ‘local’
matter that depends on the particular character of a believer’s evi-
dence about a source, one wonders whether there are any especially
worthy sources that are due deference by all, or at least most, ra-
tional believers.
In addressing the first issue, it will be useful to draw on an illumi-
4 Keep in mind that one can expect two probability functions to agree in this sense, and yet
know that they will not in fact agree. Expectations are not beliefs.©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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suggests two reasons for us to regard q as an expert. First, q might
be better informed than we are (though perhaps no better at analys-
ing data), in which case Hall calls q a database-expert. Alternatively,
q might be better than we are at evaluating the relevance of data
(without possessing more of it), in which case q is an analyst-expert.
Adam Elga (forthcoming) employs a similar distinction (using the
term ‘guru’ for Hall’s analyst-expert):
When it comes to the weather, I completely defer to the opinions of
my local weather forecaster … conditional on her having probability x
in any weather-proposition, my probability in that proposition is also
x … In treating my forecaster this way, I defer to her in two respects.
First, I defer to her information: ‘As far as the weather goes,’ I think to
myself, ‘she’s got all the information that I have—and more.’ Second,
I defer to her judgment: I defer to the manner in which she forms opin-
ions on the basis of her information.
Similarly, when Elga characterizes the notion of an epistemic peer
(whom he believes should be treated as an equal, l=½) he says that
we should regard someone as our epistemic peer when (a) they pos-
sess all the information we have, and (b) are as good as we are at
evaluating the truth-values of claims in light of this shared evidence,
so that, before evaluating a claim, we think that they and we are
equally likely to adopt the correct belief about it in light of shared ev-
idence. Similarly, Tom Kelly characterizes an epistemic peer this way:
Two individuals are epistemic peers with respect to some question if
and only if:
(i) they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the evidence
and arguments which bear on that question, and
(ii) they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues such as in-
telligence, thoughtfulness and freedom from bias. (Kelly, 2005, p. 75)
The connecting thread here is the idea that the degree of epistemic
deference we owe an information source is a matter of both (a) the
amount and character of the evidence that the source’s probability
reflect, especially relative to our own evidence, and (b) the degree to
which the source is better or worse than we are at arriving at accu-
rate probability values on the basis of whatever evidence it is given.5
To sharpen (a) and (b), begin by noting that C’s tendency to defer©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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formation she lacks. In the simplest cases, this situation can be char-
acterized as follows:
C’s deference to q is based on a lack of information about E
when: C is uncertain about E (0C(E)1); C is certain that q
is certain about E (C(q(E)∈{0,1})=1); becoming certain about
E will make q’s probability for A irrelevant to C, so that
C(A|E)=C(A|E∧q(A)=x) and C(A|¬E)=C(A|¬E∧q(A)=
x) for x∈[0,1].6
Here, C’s deference to q does not require her to admire q’s prowess
in reasoning: she defers to q solely because she believes q knows
more than she does about E.
Even when we revere an information source for its reasoning
powers, we still might not defer to it simply because we have infor-
mation it lacks. Even if my friend Ian is a splendid political analyst,
I might not defer to his judgement about the likely party of the next
Prime Minister if I have just received insider information, which he
lacks, about a brewing scandal that is likely to lead to the resigna-
tion of half the Conservative MPs in Parliament. On the other hand,
if I really do respect Ian’s political acumen, I will again defer to him
as an expert once he has been apprised of the scandal. So, say that
C’s lack of deference to q depends on her view that q lacks the
information E when: C is certain of E; C believes q is unsure of
E (C(0q(E)1)=1); and C would defer to q if q knew E, so
that the conditional probability q(•|E) is a comrade for C.7
C’s deference to q can also depend on q lacking certain evidence.
Suppose Ian is a member of a messianic cult of Conservatives who
5 Deference does not, however, require a source to have the same evidence we have, nor to
draw conclusions by the same inferential means we use. As a juror in a trial I might have lots
of evidence that the eyewitness lacks, but still defer to her as to the suspect’s guilt because
her private evidence is so much better than mine. Likewise, if George’s ‘gut intuitions’ about
horse races tend to be very reliable, I might defer to him even though I would never trust my
own ‘gut intuitions’ about such matters.
6 C’s deference to q in re A stems partly from a lack of information about E, when there is
ml such that C(A|E∧q(A)=x)=m·x + (1−m)·C(A|E) and C(A|¬E∧q(A)=x)=m·x
+(1−m)·C(A|¬E) for x∈[0,1].
7 C’s lack of deference to q in re A stems partly from q’s lack of information about E, when
there is a ml such that C(A|q(A|E)=x)=m·x + (1−m)·C(A) for all x∈[0,1].©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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twenty-first century, a direct descendant of both Winston Churchill
and Margaret Thatcher will lead the Conservatives to victory. Sup-
pose further that, unbeknownst to Ian, we have just discovered that
in 1957, when Thatcher was 32 and Churchill was 83, both stayed
in the same hotel on the same night (which, let us assume, marginal-
ly raises the minuscule probability of the two having an illegitimate
child, and so of there being a current direct descendant of both).
Even if Ian had this extra information, however, we might not trust
him to pick a winner in the next election. We might suspect that his
messianic views, which do not typically influence his predictions,
would be invigorated by information about a possible Thatcher-
Churchill tryst, and that this might lead him to overestimate the
Conservatives’ chances.
This would not happen with a perfect information processor.
Such a person will be worthy of deference no matter what evidence
is placed before her. This is what Hall means by an ‘analyst-expert’.
If we imagine the totality of C’s evidence given by some single prop-
osition Etot, which is believed certain, then
C defers to q as an analyst exactly if q(•|Etot) is a comrade for
C relative to any body of potential evidence Etot that C might
possess.
On this picture, then, epistemic deference is a function of both what
believers know about the data that information sources have at their
disposal and the degree to which the probabilities issued by these
sources reflect reasonable policies of drawing deductive and induc-
tive inferences from data. This is not meant as a sharp distinction:
there is no bright line between deference based on the quality of a
source’s information and deference based on the quality of its infor-
mation processing. One’s respect for a source as an analyst-expert
will often depend on one’s conviction that the source is well in-
formed about key logical facts. Likewise, being a database-expert
requires having a consistent set of data, and perhaps even having
data that reflect facts about reliable information processing. Even if
blunt, the database–analyst distinction is a useful tool for thinking
about the broad kinds of issues that arise when questions of epis-
temic deference arise. In many concrete cases we can separate the©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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for deferring to a source.
This is especially apparent when we turn to our second question
and inquire into the existence of sources to which deference is uni-
versal or very widespread. Consider truth@, the function that as-
signs 1 to all actual truths and 0 to all actual falsehoods. The laws
of probability ensure that every coherent believer must esteem
truth@ as an epistemic expert: C(A|truth@(A)= 1)=C(A|A)=1
whenever C(truth@(A)=1)  0. Truth@ does not need to be a great
analyst to merit this respect. Because it has so much data, its reason-
ing strategy can be simple: it consults its premisses and asserts con-
clusions that are explicitly found therein, thereby begging the
question. Deference to truth@ is due to its exhaustive premiss set: it
is a universal database-expert.8
Are there universal analyst-experts in the way that truth is a uni-
versal database-expert? Such a thing would be something like a per-
fect inductive reasoner who could come to the right conclusions no
matter what evidence it is given. One way to be such an ideal rea-
soner, of course, is to know everything up front and ignore evidence.
Truth has this feature, and so is a universal analyst-expert in virtue
of being a universal database-expert. At the other extreme one
might imagine an a priori inductive or evidential probability—
eprob—which, despite lacking special access to empirical informa-
tion, is always able to settle on the probability that is best supported
in light of any given data. (I am not at all sure that such a probabili-
ty exists, but will not air my doubts here.) If there is such a thing as
an evidential probability function, then it will be a universal ana-
lyst-expert: all rational believers will defer to it whenever it is pro-
vided with their evidence.
Between truth@, the universal database-expert, and eprob, the uni-
versal analyst-expert, there might be intermediate cases, in which we
defer to some information source partly because it knows things we
do not and partly because it is better than we are at drawing conclu-
sions from the data. Objective chance may be something like this.
8 It is a universal analyst-expert as well. However, this is only because, for any coherent C
and E with C(E)0, truth@ is database-expert for C(•|E). So, while the database–analyst
distinction is not sharp here, it seems clear that deference is underwritten by database con-
siderations.©2007 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CVII, Part 2
JAMES M. JOYCE196IV
Chance and the Principal Principle. Much of the philosophical dis-
cussion of objective chance stems from David Lewis’s justly cele-
brated ‘A Subjectivist Guide to Objective Chance’ (1980). This
article has, unfortunately, fostered a picture of chance’s epistemic
status that is misleading in two respects. First, Lewis has made it
seem that the important philosophical issues about objective chance
largely concern the fact that chance can undermine its own status as
an epistemic expert. Second, by tying his theory about the epistemic
role of chance to a specific sort of ‘best system’ metaphysics for
chance, Lewis’s work has tended to suggest that objective chance
functions like a perfect information processor, and that this is what
explains our deference to it. This picture, I will argue, obscures cru-
cial facts about chance’s epistemology. In particular, it obscures the
fact that the probability functions that realize objective chances en-
code so much information about the causes of events that our epis-
temic limitations force us to see them as database-experts.
The epistemic role of chance, according to Lewis (1980, p. 87), is
given by the Principal Principle, which says that the function that
gives the chances of events at a time should be an epistemic expert
for any coherent subjective probability function C that contains no
information that is ‘inadmissible’ at that time.
(PP) Let C be the rational credence function for someone whose ev-
idence is limited to information about the history of the world
up to time t. If E is admissible at t and if
C(E∧chancet(A)=x)0, then C(A|E∧chancet(A)=x)=x.
Lewis saw this as a kind of definition of the concept of objective
chance. ‘A feature of Reality deserves the name of chance,’ he
wrote, ‘to the extent that it occupies the definitive role of chance;
and occupying the role means obeying [PP], applied as if informa-
tion about present chances, and the complete theory of chance, were
perfectly admissible’ (Lewis, 1994, p. 489). Chance is thus defined
by its special epistemic role: chance (i) functions as an epistemic ex-
pert for all believers whose evidence is restricted to information
about the past and present, and (ii) fails to function as an epistemic
expert in re A for believers who somehow possess information©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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fits the bill (or gets close enough) is chance.
The limitation on C and the admissibility constraint are meant to
ensure that C does not incorporate information about A’s truth-val-
ue that is not reflected in its chance at t.9 As Lewis (1980, p. 92) ex-
plains it, ‘Admissible propositions are the sort of information whose
impact on credence about outcomes comes entirely by way of cre-
dence about the chances of those outcomes.’ He also tells us that in-
formation about the history of the world up to t is always
admissible, and that A and information about the future effects of
A’s truth are generally inadmissible. And in Lewis (1980) he suggests
that facts about current and past chances are always currently ad-
missible.
As is well known, on Lewis’s preferred ‘Humean’ theory of
chance, facts about chance turn out to be inadmissible because they
covertly convey information about the future. Lewis believed that
the chances at any time t are determined by the world’s history (past
and future) of the particular non-chance events. Moreover, the iden-
tity of the chance function, in Lewis’s ‘best system’ picture, is deter-
mined by considerations of fit with the observed frequencies,
simplicity, and strength. (Notice that these are the same sorts of
broadly inductive considerations that govern theory choice in gener-
al, and which we use when making inferences about the future
based on information about the past.) The problem for Lewis was
that his theory allows ‘undermining futures’ that have a non-zero
chance of occurring, so that chancet(F)=x0, but whose occur-
rence would preclude the chances from being what they are, so that
(F∧chancet(F)=x) is certainly false. PP then requires that
C(F|chancet(F)= x)= x  0, but logic requires that C(F|chancet(F)
=x)=0.
With the help of Hall (1994) and Michael Thau (1994), Lewis
(1994, p. 487) ended up solving the problem as follows. The core of
the difficulty is that Lewis’s theory of chance allows for the possibil-
ity that the current chances currently have some chance of being
9 In general, E is admissible (relative to q, A and C) just when adding it to C’s evidence does
nothing to undercut q’s status as an expert about A for C. In particular, if q is an expert for
C, then q remains an expert for C(•|E). Likewise, if E is inadmissible, then learning E does
undercut q’s status. Specifying which propositions are admissible and inadmissible is critical
to grasping a source’s epistemic status. In general, the better a source, the more things that
are admissible.©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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chancet(chancet(A)=x)1. If this is so, then it seems wrong to set
one’s credence (at t) for A at x when one supposes that A’s chance
(at t) is x. After all, one is then supposing that one has information
that the chance function itself lacks, namely the information that
chancet(A)=x. The natural solution is to modify PP so that it does
not require you to defer to chance as an expert tout court, but as an
analyst-expert, by deferring to it conditional on the information you
possess. This yields the ‘New Principle’ (NP):
(NP)Let C be the credence function for someone whose evidence
is limited to the past and present. Then, if the chances are
given by probability function P,10 then C(A|chance=P)=
P(A|chance=P). As a special case we have C(A|chancet(A)
=x∧chancet(A|chancet (A)=x)=y)=y.
NP has a lot going for it. The underlying epistemological idea is
sound: as we have seen, when we have evidence that some generally
reliable source lacks, we often defer to that source once it has been
provided with our evidence. It is no different here: the information
that the chance function lacks is just that its values are objective
chances. As soon as chance is made aware of this it will provide an-
swers to which we may defer. Second, NP does not rely on an ad-
missibility restriction. When we acquire information that would
have been inadmissible by the lights of PP, NP merely has us provide
that information to chance and defer to its better judgement.11 This
seems like an advantage.
Hall (2004, p. 101), impressed with this aspect of NP, proposes
that ‘chance is an analyst-expert … this claim holds for chances at
any time, and without qualification’ (i.e. for any proposition A for
which chance(A|E) is defined). Hall’s proposal, then, is this:
Chance is a universal analyst-expert: If C is a rational credence
function, then for any body of evidence E with C(E∧chancet
10 Here both chance and P should be thought of a two-place functions, so that this identity
means that chancet(A)=Pt(A) for all A and t.
11 Suppose we ask what we should believe if we somehow came to know A’s chance at some
future time t*t. NP gives the right answer as long as (as is reasonable to assume) future
chances trump current chances, so that C(chancet(A|chancet*(A)=x)=x)=1. ©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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This is chance as ideal inductive reasoner: give chance any evidential
input E, and it will spit out a probability to which a person with E
as her total evidence should defer.
This is not the whole story though. Chance has another property
that needs to be explained: evidence about chances is somehow able
to screen off information about the past—when neither C nor E
contains evidence about the future, chance is not merely an analyst-
expert, but an expert tout court. This is a key epistemological fact
about chance, and it seems to be one of the things that differentiates
chances from inductive or epistemic probabilities. When I know the
indeterministic coin is fair or that the polonium atom has a half-life
of 138.876 days, no amount of information about the past should
lead me to shift my probability for the events in question (unless it
first leads me to revise my view about the chances). The only way to
explain this is to suppose that chance has some information at its
disposal. Being a universal analyst-expert is not enough. When it
comes to evidence about the past, chance must be a database-expert
as well. What information does it have? One natural answer is to
suppose that chance now knows everything there is to know about
what is not now chancy. In particular,
Chance is a database-expert about the past and present: If E is
entirely about the world’s state up to time t, then
C(E∧chancet(E)1)=0, and C(A|E∧chancet(A)=x)=x.
These two principles make for a natural interpretation of chance as
it has come to be understood by philosophers in light of Lewis’s
writings. This is especially so if one thinks of chances as being fixed
by best-system considerations (though one need not be committed
to a ‘best system’ account of laws to find the principles appealing).
They also offer an explanation for our deference to chance: as long
as our evidence is no better than the information chance has at its
disposal, and in so far as we recognize that we are not as expert as
chance at drawing conclusions, we should defer to chance.
Still, one has the sense that something crucial has been left out.
All the focus on correcting for undermining futures has directed at-
tention away from a central feature of chance’s epistemic role. Pic-©2007 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CVII, Part 2
JAMES M. JOYCE200turing chance as a perfectly effective reasoner with perfect
information about the past obscures the fact that our deference to
the particular probability functions that actually realize chance is ul-
timately based on our views about the causal structure of the world,
and about the sorts of restrictions that this structure places on the
evidence we can possess.
One cannot see this clearly when one focuses exclusively on PP
and NP, and takes these to be definitions or quasi-definitions of the
concept of objective chance. Instead, one must look to the sorts of
probability functions that realize the concept in the world we inhab-
it. Deference principles like PP and NP (non-rigidly) describe proba-
bilities that can be realized in different ways in different worlds. It is
not merely that there are a variety of specific probability functions P
(rigidly specified) for which chancet=P might hold. Rather, chance
might be realized by some particular type of probability function so
that chancet=q, where q is non-rigidly described, and it might be
that our reason for deferring to chance in the way PP or NP require
is that we believe this identity and defer to q in the way PP or NP re-
quire. Indeed, this seems to be the case. Chances in our world are re-
alized by physical probabilities, like those found in quantum
mechanics. Our reasons for deferring to these physical probabilities
turn out to have much more to do with ‘database’ considerations
than with ‘analyst’ considerations. Moreover, the possibility of un-
dermining futures plays no role at all in the process.
Consider a concrete case. If you convince me, say, that you have
correctly described the complete quantum-mechanical wave func-
tion for an isolated polonium atom, and if you also convince me
that the probability of an atom with that wave function decaying
within 138.876 days is ½, then my credence for that event will be
½. My reasoning is simple:
(A) The quantum state of the system at any time encodes all
physical information about the system at that time.
(B) The quantum state of the system at any time acts a kind of
‘causal screen’ that separates past states from future events:
no future event can be an effect of a past state except by
being an effect of the present state—there are no causal
pathways to the future that do not pass through the©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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passes everything that is now causally relevant to the effect.
(C) The quantum mechanical probability for decay reflects the
totality of the information contained in the current quan-
tum state that is causally relevant to the decay. It is a kind
of summary statistic that measures the ‘causal tendency’ of
the current state to produce the effect under consideration.
(D) While there may be information that could undermine
these probabilities (specifically information about the fu-
ture), there is also a physical restriction that prevents us
from ever having access to such information as evidence—
we can condition on it (in the abstract), but cannot ever
learn it. The restriction is that we, being physical systems,
lack direct access to any information that is not about the
present and the past—our evidence is confined to facts
about our past light cone.
If one accepts these premisses (and one might question some of
them: see below), then three factors make it reasonable to defer to
physical probabilities when forming beliefs about the future.12 First,
because the current physical state of the system acts as a causal
screen for past states, any causal influence that a past state can have
on future events must be reflected in the current state. Second, since
the present physical probability of an event encodes all information
causally relevant to its occurrence that can be found in the present
state, to know this probability is to know all there is to know about
the present state as it pertains to the causes of the event.13 Third,
since, as a matter of contingent fact, we cannot have direct evidence
of the future, knowledge of the present physical state is the best evi-
dence we can possibly have about any future event. Putting this all
together, it should be clear why we should defer to physical proba-
12 I believe similar reasoning applies to the probabilities in statistical mechanics (even
though the underlying system is deterministic), and to standard coin-toss and dartboard
cases in virtue of considerations like those described in Keller (1986). In both cases the
important point is that there are physical restrictions on our ability to access information
that would undermine the authority of the relevant physical probability function. This sug-
gests that our reasons for deferring to quantum-mechanical probabilities are not centrally
located in the fact that they describe indeterministic events.©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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reflect the causal powers of a state that is detailed enough to act as a
causal screen, they serve primarily as database-experts for us: we de-
fer to them partly because we are not able to acquire any relevant
data about the causes of events that they do not already have. Of
course, we also believe that quantum mechanics spits out the correct
probabilities given the information encoded in quantum states, and
so there is an ‘analyst’ element in our deference as well. However,
we do not think of these probabilities as universal analyst-experts in
the way NP requires. There are many items of potential information
(e.g. the statement that quantum mechanics is false) about which
quantum mechanics cannot speak.
Some observations and caveats. Notice first that physical proba-
bilities need not be universal database-experts about the past. Infor-
mation may be lost in the transition from past states to the present
state, but none of it is causally relevant to the future except in so far
as it left marks on the present. Second, nothing in this picture re-
quires the current chances to supervene on the present, past or fu-
ture pattern of non-chancy facts. Third, it is essential to this picture
that the expert status of physical probability derives partly from
general limits, albeit contingent ones, on our ability to acquire evi-
dence of certain types. If we could directly intuit the future, or if we
lived in a world where backward causation permitted reliable effect-
to-cause inferences, we would have no use for physical probabilities,
and their values would not be objects of deference for us. The expert
status of physical probability derives, in large measure, from our
own epistemic limitations.
This last point highlights a key difference between the account of
chance that one finds in Hall or Lewis and the one mooted here. On
the current proposal, there is no need to think of chance on analogy
with a perfect inductive reasoner, or to portray it as an analyst-ex-
pert of some general type. Such ideas are motivated by concerns
with the failure of PP in the face of undermining futures, and these
13 It can be instructive to think about physical probabilities as they evolve over time. It is
incorrect to think of probability values at one time qt as causing values at a later time qt+1.
But because these probabilities do track the underlying causal facts, the epistemology pro-
ceeds exactly as it would if the relation were causal. Knowledge of qt+1 screens off facts
about qt in much the same way that knowledge of an intervening cause screens off knowl-
edge of any past cause that helped produce it (and is not linked to the effect by an indepen-
dent causal pathway).©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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probabilities that actually realize chance. Failures of PP would be
problematic if they involved inadmissible information we could
learn and that could serve as evidence for drawing conclusions
about the future. As quantum probabilities illustrate, this need not
be so. Cases where chance’s expert status is undercut by information
we cannot possess are, on the present proposal, treated as ‘don’t
cares’ because they are ‘can’t knows’. Think, for example, of under-
mining futures. Suppose that the current physical probabilities are
such that q(F|q(F)=x)=y. This is a bizarre situation; it means that
the causal facts are such that if the causal facts are such that F will
occur with probability x, then the causal facts are such that F will
occur with some different probability y. It is not clear how this
could even be possible; what is clear is that, even if it is possible, we
could never know that the causal facts are such that F will occur
with probability x. q(F)=x is the kind of proposition that can be
conditioned on, but not the kind that can be learned, if the physical
probabilities are as described. So, undermining futures fall in the
‘don’t care’ category even if they exist.
So, are these physical probabilities to which we defer in this way
properly called ‘chances’? To some extent, this is a question of se-
mantics (in the pejorative sense). One might decide to reserve the
honorific ‘chance’ for some super-probability that does know every-
thing about the past and that never makes mistakes in reasoning. If
so, then the sorts of physical probabilities I have been describing are
not chances. But what’s in a name? There are three things that I
would claim for the sorts of physical probabilities to which people
tend to defer: (i) they function just like chances for people with the
sorts of limited evidence that human beings have; (ii) our patterns of
deference to them are explained by their ability to reflect causal re-
lationships; and (iii) our sense that chance is worthy of epistemic
deference derives from these considerations, and not from any sense
that chance is somehow especially expert at processing information,
including information to which we have no epistemic access.
Let me close by considering a few objections that one might be in-
clined to raise against the little argument in (A)–(D).
Objection: What if (A) is false? What if there are ‘hidden varia-
bles’ on which the quantum states and probabilities depend? If©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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all past states. In particular, they do not act as causal screens
for past hidden variable states. But, if H is a past hidden state
and A is an event for which the current quantum mechanical
probability is q(A)=x, then q will not be an expert for anyone
who knows H since, assuming that hidden variables obey de-
terministic laws, C(A|H∧q(A)=x)={0,1}.
Response: This does not matter so long as we cannot learn things
about the hidden variables. If there are hidden variables, then the
current QM probability for an event does not render all evidence
about the past irrelevant, it just renders all the evidence about the
past that we can actually have irrelevant. Not all information about
the past is admissible, but all the information we can have about the
past is admissible. Perhaps if one wants to insist that there are no
chances in deterministic worlds, one may not want to call quantum
mechanical probabilities ‘chances’. Even so, the reasons for defer-
ring to quantum-mechanical probabilities would be the same.
Objection: What if (B) is false? What if there are ‘wormholes’
in space-time that allow objects and energy to traverse causal
pathways from the past to the future without making any im-
pression on the present? If this happens, the present state of a
system would no longer act as a causal screen: some future
events will be effects of past events without being effects of any
present events.
Response: Here we rightly decrease our level of deference to quan-
tum-mechanical probabilities. There are two ways this might hap-
pen. First, it could be that certain past events (the mouse going
down the wormhole yesterday) are reliably tied to certain future
events that lack present causes (the mouse suddenly appearing on
top of the cheese tomorrow). If we had information about the past
ends of these sorts of sequences, we would not defer to quantum-
mechanical probabilities. We would, instead, seek a new sort of
physical probability that agrees with the quantum probabilities
when no ‘mouse going down the wormhole’ information is availa-
ble, but which functions as an analyst-expert when such informa-
tion is present. On the other hand, if there were no predictable ties©2007 The Aristotelian Society
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chanical probabilities might well remain worth significant defer-
ence, albeit without having expert status—a comrade of high rank.
Objection: Doesn’t this picture just assume that knowledge of
causes screens off statistical information about the past?
Response: Yes, physical probabilities serve as evidential screens be-
cause they are associated with states that serve as causal screens.
This is entirely proper. Physical probabilities, and anything else that
comes close to chances in the world we inhabit, deserve deference
because they reflect information about the potential causes of future
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